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Kyrgyzstan has experienced two violent overthrows of its government in recent years.
Some hoped or feared these events would inspire or spark political change elsewhere. This
article examines what the relevant lessons of those events are and if other Central Asian
leaders, especially those in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have learned these lessons and
made adjustments to preserve their rule. It argues that while many of the lessons from
Kyrgyzstan have already been incorporated into policy, the toughest task for rulers in the
region is managing patronage politics, something that was done poorly in Kyrgyzstan.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Whereas leadership succession and regime change have
been topics debated by observers of post-Soviet Central
Asia, both phenomena remain more prospective or hypo-
thetical than real. The two largest post-Soviet Central Asian
states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have seen no leadership
change since becoming independent states nearly two
decades ago. Tajikistan’s president has retained his post
since 1992. ‘Turkmenbashi’, Turkmenistan’s ‘president for
life,’ died in ofﬁce in 2006, but his successor has not
fundamentally changed the nature of the country’s
repressive political regime. Only Kyrgyzstan, which during
the 1990s had the distinction of being the most liberal of
the Central Asian states, has seen leadership change: the
so-called Tulip Revolution of 2005 that ousted President
Askar Akayev and the still-unnamed events of 2010 that
forced his successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, from ofﬁce.
Whether either of these episodes constitutes fundamental
regime change can be debated, but both featured popular-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hanymobilization and violence and sent shockwaves throughout
the region, as the obvious questionwas whether the events
in Kyrgyzstan could occur elsewhere.
Thus far, the answer appears to be no. Whereas lead-
ership change à la Turkmenistan will, of course, be inevi-
table, the leaders of Central Asian states look, superﬁcially
at least, quite secure, safe from ouster by the ballot box,
palace coup, outside intervention, or popular mobilization
and ‘revolution,’ despite the fact that these states suffer
from a variety of economic and social ills and, by some
measures, political instability.1
This paper analyzes what the reaction in the region has
been to the upheavals in Kyrgyzstan, speciﬁcally assessing
if leaders in other countries have learned lessons from
Kyrgyzstan and made adjustments in their policies and
behaviors. Of course, ascertaining what leaders may or may
not have learned is a difﬁcult businessdleaders may not
make explicit reference to events that prompt ‘learning,’
and drawing lines of causality from one set of discrete
events to another is not easy. At best, one often has to infer1 According the World Bank Governance indicators, in 2008
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan all ranked in the bottom quarter of
all countries for political stability. Data available at http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
angUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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make a solid argument that leaders in the region, alarmed
at the prospect of Kyrgyz-style events in their own coun-
tries, have selectively drawn conclusions from what tran-
spired in Kyrgyzstan.
This article is organized in three parts. The ﬁrst brieﬂy
explores the Tulip Revolution and the events of 2010 to put
them into context and assess what they really represent.
The second section addresses causal and facilitating factors
behind them, drawing out what might be learned from
them. The ﬁnal section assesses whether one can see
evidence that other leaders in Central Asia have absorbed
and responded to the ‘lessons of Kyrgyzstan’ with the
obvious aim of preventing them from being repeated in
their countries.
1. What happened in Kyrgyzstan?
As noted above, Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian
state that has witnessed political mobilization that resulted
in leadership change. It is also perhaps not a coincidence
that Kyrgyzstan was also an outlier in terms of political
liberalization in the 1990s. Unlike in other Central Asian
states, Akayev, Kyrgyzstan’s ﬁrst post-Soviet president, was
not a leader or prominent ﬁgure from the Communist Party
establishment. Hewas initially appointed president in 1990
by the then-Soviet republic’s legislature as a compromise
candidate, but won popular re-election in 1991 and 1995. In
this period, Kyrgyzstan was a leader in the region in both
political and economic reform (Anderson, 1999). Progress
stalled, however, in the second half of the 1990s. Akayev
was re-elected in 2000 amid allegations of vote-rigging,
and in the 2000s the economy declined and the country’s
relatively democratic system became increasingly corrupt
and centralized as Akayev garnered more powers for
himself, his family, and his political cronies. In 2002, police
killed ﬁve people protesting the jailing of a local politician,
leading to months of protests and fears of civil war.
However, it was in 2005, after allegations of fraud in
parliamentary elections, that Akayev was ﬁnally forced
from ofﬁce, replaced as president by Bakiyev, an ex-Akayev
ally who had served as prime minister from 2000 to 2002.
The movement that ousted Akayev became known as
the ‘Tulip Revolution,’ andwas hailed by some as analogous
to the 2003 and 2004 ‘Rose’ and ‘Orange’ Revolutions that
swept corrupt, anti-democratic leaders from ofﬁce in
Georgia and Ukraine. While there were certain
similaritiesdmost obviously popular mobilization spurred
by allegations of vote-riggingdit quickly became apparent
that there were important differences as well: initial
mobilization was localized in the south of the country and
conﬁned to relatives, friends, and close associates of
defeated candidates, mostly wealthy elites; patronage ties
continued to feature prominently as protests drew in
strength; protesters tended to be older and rural, with
liberal youth groups and NGOs relatively sidelined; there
was violence between pro- and anti-Akayev forces and
widespread looting and arson in the capital in the wake of
the government’s collapse. Many early observers opined
that the ‘Tulip Revolution’ was no revolution at all or even
a regime change; it was a ‘coup d’état’ inwhich clan leadersplayed larger role than the common people and resulted in
a transfer of power from one elite group to another but
little real political change (Kniazev, 2006; Marat, 2006;
Pavlovskii, 2005; Radnitz, 2006, 2010; Tudoroiu, 2007).
Over time, it became even more apparent that the Tulip
Revolution was not going to live up to whatever promise it
may have had. Through a process of elite bargaining, Bakiyev
was able to become president, but he lost the support of
manyof his allieswithin a year, reneging on commitments to
amend the constitution to take away powers from the
presidency, thus preserving core elements ‘patronal presi-
dentialism’ (Hale, 2006,315–316). Therewerealsonumerous
assassinationsof political and criminalﬁgures. In fall of 2007,
Bakiyev used a referendumdwhose results many observers
believe were falsiﬁeddto adopt a new constitution with
enhanced presidential powers, and parliamentary elections
that year also delivered a convincing victorydagain, many
say illegitimatedto his Ak Zhol Party while well-known
political ﬁgures who had been elected in the past thanks to
clan/tribal ties lost their seats (Torogeldieva, 2010, 18).
Meanwhile, some opponents to Bakiyev were jailed on
trumped-up charges, the government gained more control
over themedia, corruptionandorganizedcrimecontinued to
be a serious problem, and many Kyrgyz citizens remained
mired in poverty (Marat, 2008 and Cherniavskiy, 2010).
Despite thebeliefbymany that thingshadgottenworse since
2005, Bakiyev was re-elected president in 2009 with 78% of
the votednot quite the 90%þ seen for incumbent presidents
in other Central Asian statesdin elections that many Kyrgyz
and foreign observers viewed as fundamentally ﬂawed. In
2009, for theﬁrst time, FreedomHouse rankedKyrgyzstanas
a ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’, a designation that all
other Central Asian states have ‘enjoyed’ since gaining
independence.Theauthorof its2009Nations inTransit report
suggested that Bakiyev had ‘secured loyalty of all state
institutions’ and ‘built the basis to prolong his power despite
low popularity at home’ (Marat, 2009, 288).
In April 2010, however, it became apparent that
Bakiyev’s base had shrunk and that his rule was not as
secure as that of his fellow Central Asian leaders. In his
efforts to construct a formidable power vertical, he had
alienated many regional and business leaders, as his
various efforts to redistribute property allegedly stolen by
Akayev and his backers was handed over to Bakiyev’s
supporters and relatives (Laumulin, 2010, 24). His dismissal
and imprisonment of Defense Minister Ismail Isakov on
what was viewed as politically motivated charges also
looks unwise in retrospect. Disaffectionwith Bakiyev boiled
over in April 2010 when the government announced an
increase in fuel prices. As in 2005, demonstrators occupied
government buildings across the country, although this
time they were met with deadly violence by government
security forces. Nearly a hundred people were killed, but
protests continued, and Bakiyev ﬂed Bishkek for the south
of the country, his political base. Roza Utunbayeva, who
served as foreign minister under both Akayev and Bakiyev,
emerged as head of the anti-Bakiyev forces and declared
herself interim leader while promising political reform.
Massive violence in the south of the country in June 2010,
arguably instigated by allies of Bakiyev and directed at
ethnic Uzbeks, many of whom aligned themselves with the
4 Corruption data fromWorld Bank Governance Indicators, cited above,
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civil war and genocide.
A complete analysis of what occurred in 2010 and
assessment of whether or not Kyrgyzstan can put itself back
together is beyond the scope of this paperdalthough
approval in June 2010 of a new constitution that limits
presidential powers and multiparty elections in October
2010 may bode well. Compared with 2005, the events in
2010 were far more chaotic and violent, a ‘peasant riot’
according to one observer (Cherniavskiy, 2010, 39). They
were not centered around an election, began with protests
in thenorthof the countryasopposed tosouth, andarguably
had more of a spontaneous and grassroots component
(Khamidov, 2010). Nonetheless, the resultdinstallation of
a new government peopled by ﬁgures from past
governmentsdwas similar, prompting some to decry the
outcome as a ‘hijacking’, reﬂecting that Kyrgyz politics is
controlled by a small band of elites that move in and out of
power (McGlinchey, 2010).While it is clear inbothcases that
average Kyrgyz had legitimate grievances against the
government, the willingness and ability of political ﬁgures
who had fallen out of favor with the government to ride the
wave of popular discontentwas decisive. In each case, it was
the political ‘outs’dkept out of power because of the vaga-
ries of patronage politics worked against their clan or
region2dwho played key roles as they commandeered the
cause of the protestors as a means to regain the reins of
power. One postmortem on the Akayev regime suggested
that, ‘In his ﬁnal few years in power former president Askar
Akayev sought to restrict the power of key patronage
groups, and as a result drovemore andmoreof the country’s
leading political ﬁgures into opposition’ (Olcott, 2005). The
same could be said of Bakiyev, as leading anti-Akayev
opponents who were not incorporated into his regime
becamehis opponents by the end of the 2000s and assumed
leadership posts afterhis ouster. The result, according to one
observer, was ‘another restructuring of clan relations’ in
which ‘power is not used for governing but for personal
enrichment’ (Cherniavskiy, 2010, 43).
The crucial point from this review is that we should not
view events in Kyrgyzstan as part of a mass democratic
uprising, led by forces ‘from below’ intent on fundamen-
tally remaking the political system.3 Protests were impor-
tant catalysts, but they started off as localized, and were
ultimately shaped and directed by the state of patronage
politics in the country as they were seized upon by former
political insiders who had defected from or been tossed
aside by the regime. The issue, from the regime’s
perspective, can be boiled down to Hirschman’s (1970)
classic schematic of ‘voice’, ‘loyalty’, and ‘exit’: how to
ensure the loyalty of key actors, if and to what extent to
giving them a voice would be wise, and how to prevent
their exit and possible formation of a bloc to challenge the
regime. As one looks for possible ‘lessons’ of these events,2 Patrimonial and clan politics have become important lenses for
viewing developments both in Kyrgyzstan and throughout the region. See
Ishiyama, 2002; Collins, 2006; Ilkhamov, 2010; and McGlinchey, 2011.
3 Whether that characterization describes what occurred in Georgia or
Ukraine is also debatable.then, it is important to keep in mind both state-society
divisions as well as the dilemmas facing the authorities to
ensure elite unity and prevent the emergence of a counter-
elite that cannot just protest but seize power.
2. Looking for political lessons in Kyrgyzstan
Depending upon one’s interest and perspective, one
could derive a number of lessons from events in
Kyrgyzstan. This paper’s focus is not on the positive lessons
(more relevant for regime opponents) of how to seize
power but on the negative lessons (more relevant for elites
controlling the state apparatus) what to avoid or not do in
order to preserve power.
One way of ascertaining what the lessons of Kyrgyzstan
are is to illuminate likely causes of the 2005 and 2010
upheavals. As one might expect, there are numerous
possible explanatory factors, some unique to Kyrgyzstan
and others that may have wider applicability in the region.
Let us take up several such factors in turn.2.1. Popular dissatisfaction with the regime
Popular disenchantment with incumbents would
appear to be a necessary explanatory factor in accounting
for the ouster of Kyrgyz leaders in both 2005 and 2010.
After all, in both cases thousands of people mobilized and
demanded a change in leadership. What is unclear,
however, is what produced this disenchantment and
whether lack of support for the government is both
necessary and sufﬁcient to account for its collapse.
Observers in both 2005 and 2010 noted widespread
opposition to the Kyrgyz government. Many singled out
two factors that helped account for this: poor economic
conditions and widespread corruption (Cherniavskiy, 2010;
Laumulin, 2010; Marat, 2008, 2009; Tchantouridze, 2006).
Indeed, data do demonstrate that throughout the 2000s,
Kyrgyzstan experienced economic difﬁculties and became
increasingly corrupt.4 However, on various measures of
corruption developed by the World Bank (e.g. control of
corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness),
Kyrgyzstan prior to the Tulip Revolution largely ranked
better than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where leaders
successfully stayed in power. Whereas Kyrgyzstan’s growth
rates in the early 2000s were relatively low, it experienced
a steeper decline in the early-mid 1990s, and on several
measures developed by the United Nations Development
Programme (e.g. inequality, poverty index) in the mid-
2000s it fared similar to or better than Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.5 Thus, while not denying
that corruption and economic troubles may have fedfor example, found the control of corruption score go from 0.8 in 2000
to 1.1 in 2004, the year before the Tulip Revolution. For the economy,
average growth in real GDP from 2001-2006 was 3.63%, the lowest in
Central Asia. Data presented in Christoph Stefes and Amanda Wooden,
“Tempting Two Fates,” p. 18.
5 Data from country tables of UNDP, available at http://hdrstats.undp.
org/en/countries. Economically, Kazakhstan fares the best of all Central
Asian states.
6 Tudoroiu, 2007; Tursunkulova, 2008; and McGlinchey, 2009b. More
broadly speaking, it has been the moderately or “competitive” authori-
tarian regimes that have been most vulnerable to ouster. See McFaul,
2005.
7 Juraev, 2008, provides a good discussion of these issues.
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explainwhy political upheavals occurred in Kyrgyzstan and
not elsewhere in the region.
Additionally, one might ask who was most discontent
with the government. Based upon where mobilization
began, one can distill a regional pattern: in 2005, protests
began in southern regions of the country (e.g. Osh, Jalala-
bad), whereas in 2010 disturbances began in the north (e.g.
Talas, Naryn) and then spread to the south after the
government had been ousted. This should not be surprising:
many observers of Kyrgyz politics have noted a north-south
division (based on topography, ethnicity, economic infra-
structure) that dates at least to the Soviet period, if not
before (among others, see Jones Luong, 2002; Collins, 2006;
Ryabkov, 2008; and McGlinchey, 2009b). Both Akayev (a
northerner) and Bakiyev (a southerner) utilized patronage
networkswith a regional and clan basis, demonstrating that
it is not corruption per se but poorly-managed or ineffective
networks that exclude important actors that lead to elite
defection (‘exit’) and/or invite the creation of rival networks
that it is the real problem (Hale, 2009). Thus, alienated
groups in southern Kyrgyzstan spearheaded resistance to
Akayev, particularly after some elites in the region were
declared losers in the 2005 parliamentary elections, and in
2010 alienated northernersdalthough to be fair not exclu-
sively northernersdrallied against Bakiyev, who was seen
as promoting the interests of individuals from southern
Kyrgyzstan.
2.2. Outside support
In the immediate aftermath of the Tulip Revolution,
some spoke of a wave of ‘colored revolutions’ that swept
the post-communist space and argued that the later
‘revolutions’ received both moral and material support
from their predecessors (McFaul, 2005 and Cummings &
Ryabkov, 2008). Some observers argued, for example, that
the Tulip Revolution was precipitated by Western actors
who wanted to oust Akayev and thus provided crucial
support to opposition groups, in particular non-govern-
mental organizations (Mikheev, 2005). Hale (2006)
suggests that other post-Soviet leaders have heeded this
apparent ‘lesson’, instigating crackdowns on foreign orga-
nizations and domestic groups that receive foreign support.
This may be, however, the wrong lesson, as Hale himself
argues. Indeed, many have de-emphasized the role of
Western-backed NGOs in the Tulip Revolution, arguing that
they played marginal roles compared to regional and clan
networks and/or that discontent with Akayev had long
been brewing and that the ‘revolution’ was therefore
rooted in domestic circumstances and undertaken by actors
who had learned lessons from what had transpired in the
early 2000s in Kyrgyzstan, not in Georgia or Ukraine
(Tursunkulova, 2008).
As for 2010, the primary allegation was that Russia
backed the anti-Bakiyevmovement in response to Bakiyev’s
agreement to allow the US continued access to the Manas
airbase (Laumulin, 2010, 35–36). Whereas Moscow did
eagerly recognize the new Kyrgyz government, there is no
solid evidence ofmaterial or ﬁnancial support to opposition
forces, let alone proof that such aid was decisive.2.3. Kyrgyzstan’s unique political history
As noted, Kyrgyzstan has been a political outlier in the
region in both the 1990s and 2000s. Although Kyrgyzstan
distinguishes itself in eachdecadeondifferent criteria, some
observers have tried to draw a connection. In other words,
the argument is that the relative democratic and liberal
nature of Kyrgyz politics in the 1990s created both space for
political pluralism and a culture of political protest, with
various actors, including economic elites, relatively well-
connected to social bases for support.6 From this perspec-
tive, the relative liberalization of the early 1990s created
institutions and structuresdrival factions and political
parties and, for Central Asia at any rate, a relatively vibrant
civil societydand an ethos that facilitated the emergence
and persistence of challengers to the political regime.
AlthoughAkayevand then Bakiyev tried to consolidate their
authority and had some success, for example, in gaining
more constitutional power and placing relatives in sensitive
positions, they were never immune from protests and
political rivals.Why thismight be so is a good questiondthe
need to court outside support because of lack of economic
resources, the vagaries of Kyrgyz politics in the late Soviet
period thatproduceda fracturedelite (McGlinchey, 2011), or
limitations of patronage politics in Kyrgyzstan, discussed
below, may supply an answer beyond arguments about
‘culture’7dbut theobvious lesson fromthis perspective, one
long implemented by autocrats in Central Asia, is to avoid
political liberalization and clamp down on independent
political activity. At best, then, these ‘lessons’ of the Tulip
Revolution and subsequent events inKyrgyzstanwould only
serve to reinforcewell-establishedpractices in other Central
Asian states.2.4. Elections as catalysts for ‘Revolution’
A corollary of sorts from the above explanation would
emphasize elections as important events, ones that expose
rulers to possible censure, draw international attention to
their country, may require of them various machinations to
ensure a positive result, and can mobilize possible oppo-
nents around both a particular candidate and, particularly if
there is widespread belief that the elections are stolen, the
cause of justice and fairness (Tucker, 2007). Advocates of
this point would note that allegations of vote-rigging
sparked the Rose, Orange, and Tulip Revolutions by galva-
nizing heretofore diffuse discontent with the government
into a popular movement and making individuals more
likely to engage in the risky action of protest and police and
government forces less willing to stand up for a regime that
had discredited itself.
While the discourse of protest and ‘people power’ has
a romantic ring to it, by itself it fails to explain why so few
were willing to stand up for regimes, that, heretofore, had
8 Ilkhamov, 2010, pp. 200–201 reminds us that whereas clans rely more
upon primordial or kinship, patron–client relations can be more ﬂuid
particularly if they are based on interest calculations of a political-
economic exchange relationship. Whether or not informal networks in
Central Asia should be viewed through the perspective of clan or region
need not concern us here. For different perspectives on this matter, see
Jones Luong, 2002 and Collins, 2006.
9 For example, Akayev’s son Aidar was involved with many Kyrgyz
businesses, headed the Olympic Committee, and ran for parliament in
2005, as did his sister, Bermet. Some also thought Akayev was grooming
his wife, Mairam, as his successor. Bakiyev appointed his brothers, sons,
and personal friends to important economic, defense, and security posi-
tions, and some believed that he was grooming his son Maxim to assume
his post after his term of ofﬁce would have ended in 2013. See Laumulin,
2010.
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fully rig elections. One answer, suggested by Hale (2009), is
that elections are important tests of intra-elite power,
particularly when the incumbent leader has become a lame
duck by acknowledging that he will not be running for
another term of ofﬁce. Rival groups, which heretofore
might have been united in a patronage network, thus
emerge to assert their own power and make their claim to
become top of the political-patronage pyramid. In other
words, elections in these circumstances expose cracks in
the regimes and help to dismantle or reconﬁgure the
informal institutions that helped prop them up. Particularly
in countries with severe socio-economic problems and at
least a quasi-free political system, factions tied more
closely to the incumbents might have to resort to various
shenanigans to ‘win’ the election, giving rivals the chance
to seize on protests and demands for justice in order to gain
power. From this perspective, it was the ‘lame-duckness’ of
existing leaders, coupled with quasi-open politics that
allowed political opposition to contest elections, that made
the ‘colored’ revolutions possible.
This explanation is obviously less relevant for 2010
events in Kyrgyzstan, but even before 2005 it was clear that
rulers in Central Asia had made it difﬁcult for elections to
produce real change. Unlike Akayev, who declared he
would not stand in presidential elections scheduled for the
fall of 2005, other Central Asian presidents have not
respected term-limits, using rigged referendums to extend
their terms in ofﬁce, or, in the case of Turkmenbashi,
becoming president for life. None have become lame ducks
or show any signs of wanting to become one (for obvious
reasons), and political competition is so circumscribed in
the other states in the region that elections are not mean-
ingful events, as outcomes are pre-determined from above
and the ‘opposition’ parties that do run are either unwilling
or unable to challenge their results.
Thus, one could say that Central Asian leaders have
already ‘learned’ this lesson, and elections will not serve as
a catalyst to oust them from power. That said, of course, all
presidents in Central Asia will leave ofﬁce, even if they are
wheeled out in a casket. One could imagine a succession
struggle taking place and that elections might become
important vehicles for rivals to test their support and power,
thus producing a Tulip Revolution-like scenario. However,
this did not occur in Turkmenistan in 2006, testimony,
perhaps, to the degree of elite unity and effective use of
patronage and political manipulation by Turkmenbashi.
Thus, the key element appears to be how well a leader can
keep his ‘team’ united, secure and happy so that no rival can
emerge to exploit latent discontent and build a rival team.
2.5. Breakdown of patronage
The above discussion, at several points, brings us to the
issue of patronage or neo-patrimonial politics, a phenom-
enonwidely remarked upon in discussions of Central Asian
politics. As noted, many commentators suggested the Tulip
Revolution in 2005 and events in 2010 resulted from
a breakdown in patronage politics.
Patronage politics ties in with much of the above
discussion. For example, it was not just that Kyrgyzstan hadeconomic troubles; it was the relative lack of resources that
made it difﬁcult for the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes to
maintaineffectivepatron–client relationships (Cherniavskiy,
2010 and McGlinchey, 2011). The importance of patronage,
typically dispensed through clan, tribal, and/or regional8
networks helps explain the lack of state capacity (e.g.
informal rules and institutions matter more than formal
ones), the relative political pluralism in Kyrgyzstan
throughout thepost-Sovietperiod, and thenatureofpolitical
mobilization and protest (Juraev, 2008). The importance of
informal politics also, paradoxically, explains why elections,
particularly after Akayev became a lame duck, mobilized his
opponents and led to regime’s downfall, as various factions
contested for formal political power to strengthen their
informal networks and ensure they would be tops in the
post-Akayev period on the pyramid of patronage.
The lesson, therefore, is to do what is necessary to
maintain patronage networks to minimize or silence the
opposition and keep would-be rivals in check. How one
does this, of course, is a good question, and strategies may
differ because of particular circumstances and some
options may simply be off the table. For example,
Kyrgyzstan, unlike Kazakhstan, is not awash in revenue
from oil and gas, thus limiting the ability of Akayev or any
Kyrgyz leader from using state largesse to establish lavish
and widespread levels of patronage to secure the loyalty of
various clan and regional networks. To put matters some-
what crassly, there might not have been enough to go
around in Kyrgyzstan, necessitating jettisoning some from
patronage networks (a forcible ‘exit’ in Hirschman’s (1970)
terms) and/or sparking the emergence of alternative, more
local networks, some of which have a more Islamic orien-
tation (McGlinchey, 2009a and Laumulin, 2010). In other
words, maintenance of power, at least in the Kyrgyz envi-
ronment, requires pacts (Collins, 2006) and a careful
balancing of various interests, recognizing that the one at
the top may lack the means or capacity to keep all happy.
Ultimately, when economic constraints and opposition to
the regime became more acute, both Akayev and Bakiyev
circled the wagons, restricting ‘voice’ by relying heavily on
family9 and their own clans/local networks to help them
rule nationally. Indeed, Bakiyev passed political reforms,
particularly elimination of local governor elections and
adoption of a party-list based proportional representation
system for the 2007 parliamentary elections, that would
decrease the importance and power of local luminaries
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hands of national political parties, the largest of which was
under his control (Juraev, 2008, 261). The results produced
an overwhelmingly pro-Bakiyev parliament but a situation
in which many of his critics ended up denied a seat in
parliament and thus at trough for patronage and corrup-
tion. Viewed from this angle, the problem for Bakiyev was
not necessarily toomuch corruption but that too few actors
were able to line their pockets.
It is possible in different settings, of course, that co-
optation or pacts are not necessary, particularly if one
group has sufﬁcient resources and coercive capacity to
repress would-be opponents. From this perspective,
opponents who resign their posts or run afoul of the
authorities need to be eliminateddphysically if necessary.
This, by most accounts, was not possible in Kyrgyzstan but
is what has occurred in Uzbekistan, although this runs the
obvious risk of creating more and perhaps violent opposi-
tion to the regime. Less harshly, one could also try to
establish stronger vertical lines of power by moving
personnel around so they cannot establish a functional or
regional base and ensuring that only loyalists occupy key
positions. This was arguably the thrust of Akayev’s and
Bakiyev’s intent, and perhaps the lesson is simply that one
should simply do it better (e.g. promote more loyalists,
limit possibilities of opponents to be politically relevant).
Ultimately, then, the central lesson from events in
Kyrgyzstan is preventing a breakdown in the ruling polit-
ical machine. Indeed, it could not be lost on anyone that
Akayev and Bakiyev were replaced by individuals who had
previously served in their administrations. While some
lessons (e.g. don’t become a lame duck and allow even
quasi-free elections) would seem to apply to all autocrats in
the region, the key strategic choice boils down to one
posited by Machiavelli in The Prince: to be loved or feared.
In the former situation, one would employ softer, more
inclusive neo-patrimonial practices by relying on pacts to
balance forces and minimize opposition while hoping to
remain indispensable at the top of the pyramid, whereas
the later ‘hard’ strategy would rely upon a more narrowly-
constructed ruling elite and rely upon force to repress or
eliminate opposition (Ilkhamov, 2010, 208–209). In all
likelihood, the choice of ‘lesson’ will depend in part upon
what policies a given government has already been
pursuing as well as the resources available to it.
3. Has anyone learned any lessons?
It is one thing to suggest, as a largely academic exercise,
what the lessons of the 2005 and 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan
could or should be. It is another to demonstrate that polit-
ical actors have learned them and acted upon them. This,
however, is not always easy to do. Whereas a shift in policy
in the predicted direction might be persuasive evidence of
learning, it would bemore difﬁcult to demonstrate learning
if one’s policies were already aligned with the ‘lesson’ (e.g.
don’t become a lame duck and conduct quasi-free elec-
tions) and thus one simply maintained one’s course. In
these cases, it is tough to tell if such phenomena are the
result of inertia or conscious recognition that one is already
doing the ‘right thing’? One way to overcome problems ofinterpretation is to look to see if leaders recognize the
importance of certain events andmake links between those
and their own policies. In other words, are events that
might inspire learning even on their cognitive map?
Assuming that is the case, one can then try to assess both
the broad direction of policy as well as decision-points and
see if choices are aligned with what one would expect.
The following sections attempt to do that, restricting
analysis to the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two
largest Central Asian states and also the two where there
has been no post-Soviet leadership change. Whereas one
might argue, particularly in the case of Kazakhstan, that
leaders are alreadyenvisioning succession to their ruled for
reasons of mortality if nothing elsedit is reasonable to
suggest that neither President Nursultan Nazarbaev of
Kazakhstan or President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan want
to go the way of Akayev and Bakiyev. For nearly twenty
years, both have built powerful authoritarian
political systems and have employed a combination of
meansdpatronage and co-optation, nepotism, rigged
elections, intimidation of opponents, and, particularly in
Karimov’s case, brutal repressiondto maintain their rule.
Akayev and Bakiyev, arguably, were trying to build a similar
ediﬁce thatwould solidify their rule. Both failed. In thewake
of their failures, what has been the reaction and response of
Nazarbaev and Karimov, and are they adopting policies
likely to prevent the appearance of a ‘tulip-like’ revolution
in their countries?
3.1. Developments in Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has the dubious distinction of being, by
measures such as those employed by the World Bank and
Freedom House, the ‘second-least authoritarian’ state in
Central Asia, although the degree of civic and political
freedom in the country is highly limited. Additionally, it is by
far the wealthiest country in the region, the result of
industrialization during the Soviet period, relatively
successful economic reforms in the post-Soviet period, and
exploitation of its oil and gas reserves. President Nazarbaev
has held his post since 1990, gaining an extension of his term
in a referendum in 1995 and in 2007 amending the consti-
tution so that hedbut no future Kazakh presidentdwill be
able to serve an unlimited number of terms.
Nazarbaev has proven himself quite adroit at fending off
possible challenges to his rule. For example, some thought
the formation of the reform-oriented Democratic Choice of
Kazakhstan (DKC) party in the early 2000s, initiated by
former government ofﬁcials as well as leading Kazakh
business ﬁgures, would form the basis of a counter-elite that
Nazarbaev could not easily control. That did not happen:
ofﬁcials allied with the DKC were dismissed from the
government and the party was liquidated in December
2004, not coincidentally at the time of the Orange Revolu-
tion (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2005; Isaacs, 2008; and Karmazina,
2008). Indeed, Nazarbaev was wary of any sort of infection
from the colored revolutions making its way into
Kazakhstan, preferring a ‘colorless revolution’ (Isaacs, 2010,
206) that he himself could control. Indeed, Nazarbaev took
the lead in various reform measures in the early and mid-
2000s, with opposition groups playing a marginal role.
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movements for reform inKazakhstan, suchas the creation in
2004 of a National Commission for Democratization and
Civil Society. While this was designed to be, at best, reform
‘fromabove’, some found inspiration in the Tulip Revolution
for launching reform ‘frombelow’. For example, one Kazakh
youth group established an ofﬁce in Kyrgyzstan and began
organizing in advanceof Kazakhstan’s presidential elections
in December 2005 (Hale, 2006, 317). Opposition groups
united in advance of this election, nominating Zharmakhan
Tuyakbai, a former chairman of theMajlis (lower house) and
Nazarbaev ally, to run for president, making him a Yush-
chenko to Nazarbaev’s Kuchma.10 Nazarbaev, naturally, was
not interested in an electoral revolution in his country,
speaking out against developments both in Ukraine and in
neighboring Kyrgyzstan and emphasizing his rule as
a guarantor of stability. Amid unprecedented ‘nervousness’
and ‘heightening fears’ of something similar occurring in
Kazakhstan, efforts were stepped up to prevent public
gatherings, put a large police presence on the streets, and
ensure a favorable result forNazarbaev so that no leadership
change could occur.11 The resultsd91 percent of the vote for
Nazarbaev and no street protestsdwere a success from the
government’s perspective.
In 2006, Nazarbaev became chair of the newly-created
State Commission for Democratic Reforms. Thework of this
commission resulted a series of constitutional changes, all
favorable to Nazarbaev, who gained more direct appoint-
ments to both legislative houses, retained the right to
appoint regional and local akims, and was permitted to run
for asmany terms of ofﬁce as hewishes, thereby preventing
him from becoming a ‘lame duck’ and prompting one
commentator to refer to the ‘Turkmenbashization’ of
Kazakh politics (Duvanov, 2007). The changes also intro-
duced proportional representation for parliamentary elec-
tions and stipulated that any deputy dismissed by his/her
party automatically loses her mandate. On paper, this gives
more power to political parties, but given that Kazakh
political parties are largely controlled by the executive, the
net effect is to prevent the election of any political inde-
pendentsorwould-bechallengers toNazarbaev.As it turned
out, the only party to clear the seven percent electoral
threshold in2009elections (with88percentof thevote), the
Nur Otan Party, is a Nazarbaev creation, a merger of various
pro-presidential parties, and will now be the only party to
receive stateﬁnancing, givingNazarbaevanother channel to
dispense patronage. All ‘reform’ in Kazakhstan has thus
consolidated executive power. Parliament,which in the past
had been a forum for clan notables, is fully under Naza-
rbaev’s control, leading one opposition ﬁgure to assert that
there are ‘no independent institutions’ as everything is
designed to ‘serve only one person’ (Najibullah, 2009).
This development is a reﬂection of Nazarbaev’s priority
onnational unity, includingovercoming tribal/clandivisions.10 The Kazakh opposition was clearly inspired by events in Ukraine,
which occurred before the Tulip Revolution. See Isaacs, 2010, pp. 205–
206.
11 Baurzhan Tieusenov, “Kazakhstan: Much Talk, but no Revolution,” The
Messenger (Almaty), December 5, 2005, and Isaacs, 2010.In large part, he has been successful. Even though he himself
comes from the small Shaprashty clan from the Great
(Southern) Horde, he has made various alliancesdthrough
his time in Soviet patronage networks, through his wife’s
familyandclan, andbyvirtue ofhis control overmonies from
oil and gas exportsdthat have incorporated various factions
into Nazarbaev’s fold. While the traditional tribal (zhuz)
systemstill exists at the local level as a sourceofpatronage, at
the national level Nazarbaev and his family, which has
literally made billions of dollars, are at the pinnacle of all
formal and informal institutions of power (Sanglibev, 2010
and Olcott, 2010). Unlike in the case in Kyrgyzstan, would-
be rivals to Nazarbaevdmeaning in practice economic
elitesdhave little connection to independent or grassroots
bases for support. They rely upon access to the state,
particularly the oil and gas sector. Political competition is
increasingly a family affair, as seen by the rise and fall of
Nazarbaev’s son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev, who was arrested in
2007 for kidnapping, corruption, and allegedly plotting
a coup,12 and the current leading role played byanother son-
in-law, Timur Kulibayev, who is the chairman of several
energy companies and is often mentioned as a successor to
Nazarbaev. Aliyev’s case demonstrates, however, an impor-
tant point, as, once he was pushed outside the system (a
forced ‘exit’), he had no base upon which he could mount
a credible opposition to Nazarbaev, let alone spearhead
popular mobilization against the regime. This was not, as
suggested above, the case in Kyrgyzstan, where those not
included in Akayev’s or Bakiyev’s increasingly narrow circle
were able to mobilize opposition.
The example of Aliyev, which was accompanied by
apurge in the security services, also suggests thatNazarbaev
remains wary of possible challengers. Anti-corruption
campaigns were used in 2008 and 2009 to deﬂect criticism
away from Nazarbaev and remove possible opponents and
in 2010 he appointed a loyalist to head theNational Security
Committee in amove thatmany interpreted as a sign that he
wanted to prevent any opponent, most likely Astana mayor
Imangali Tasmaganbetov, from challenging him in elections
in 2012.13 Meanwhile, at the more grassroots level, Naza-
rbaev controls the appointment of local leadersdand he
embraced ‘Kazakhiﬁcation’ by appointing ethnic Kazakhs to
government jobs and gradually displacing minority Slavs
(Olcott, 2010)dand the Presidential Administration uses
state funds in various ways (salaries of state ofﬁcials, over-
seas educational opportunities, housing programs) to cater
to a growing middle class, co-opt organizations in civil
society, and help ensure Nazarbaev’s public support, which
is taking on some elements of a Turkmenbashi-like cult
(Isaacs, 2010). In this environmentdunlike the case in
poorer Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistandno rival networks can
emerge to challenge the patronage-pyramid headed by
Nazarbaev (McGlinchey, 2011).
Does this account demonstrate learning? This is hard to
demonstrate conclusively. On the one hand, the Tulip12 Many have suggested that the charges are politically motivated and
occurred only after Aliyev began to voice opposition to Nazarbaev and
suggest he might run for the presidency in 2012.
13 Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 20, 2010.
15 Backers of Karimov claimed that constitutional changes to the term of
the presidentdfrom ﬁve to seven yearsdallowed him to run in 2007 his
“ﬁrst” seven-year term. This claim, similar to one ﬂoated by Kuchma in
Ukraine in 2004, was never contested by political actors in Uzbekistan.
16 A partial exception is Ismoil Jurabekov, a senior ﬁgure in the
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desire to see no repeat of such events during Kazakh
elections in 2005. After this, Nazarbaev has made many
moves to consolidate his control over formal and informal
institutions, in line with some of the ‘lessons’ of Kyrgyzstan
and demonstrating clearly what ‘reform’ or ‘democratiza-
tion’ means in the Kazakh environment. These develop-
ments, however, are not radical shifts fromwhat Nazarbaev
had been doing previously. Moreover, they may have been
made primarily as a reaction to domestic political devel-
opments (e.g. fears of a challenge from his ex-son-in-law),
designed to make Nazarbaev indispensable as a (relatively
neutral) arbiter among various clan and elite factions,
a ‘lesson’ that Akayev and Bakiyev never really learned.
3.2. Developments in Uzbekistan
Since the collapse of Soviet rule, Uzbekistan has ranked
among the most repressive of all post-Soviet states, with
political power increasingly concentrated in the hands of
President Islam Karimov. Electoral competition has been
effectively eliminated. Karimov has harassed, jailed, and
exiled his political opponents. Protesters have been killed by
security forces. Karimov has used worries about the clandes-
tine IslamicMovement of Uzbekistandwhich hehas branded
a terrorist organizationdto justify his tight reign on power.
Since 2005, there has been little sign of change: if
anything, Uzbekistan has become even more repressive
and centralized. Interestingly, in January 2005 the
government unveiled an ostensibly reformist campaign,
‘From a strong state to a strong civil society.’ One should be
careful in making too much of this, as longstanding oppo-
sition groups such as Erk and Birlik were still denied the
right to register and become recognized political parties.
Nonetheless, one group, the ‘Sunny Uzbekistan’ coalition,
emerged with the stated goal of working with the
government and supporting grassroots mobilization in the
name of political reform (Borisov, 2008, 143).
All of this was quickly squashed after the Tulip Revo-
lution in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The best-known event
was the killings of hundreds of protestors in Andijan inMay
2005 and the subsequent arrest of hundreds more who
Karimov alleged sought the overthrow the government in
favor of creating an Islamic government. Indeed, the
massacre in Andijan, taken with steps to expel or limit the
work of foreign media and organizations in Uzbekistan, as
well as the later arrest in fall 2005 of the leaders of ‘Sunny
Uzbekistan’, can be seen as Karimov’s answer to the Tulip
Revolution. In short, the lesson he drew was that the Tulip
Revolutionwas ‘allowed’ to happen by the unwillingness to
clamp down on protesters and civic groups and the foreign
organizations allegedly supporting them. For example, he
stated that Andijan was an effort to ‘repeat the coup in
Kyrgyzstan’ but that this would not happen. ‘We have the
necessary force for that’, he claimed.14
Political repression in Uzbekistan, however, is nothing
new, and, as suggested, may not be the only or even proper14 See Sredniaia Aziia: Andizhanskii scenario (Moscow: Evropa, 2005),
p. 30, and Hale, 2006, p. 320.lesson to draw from events in Kyrgyzstan. Karimov, has,
however, also changed the institutional makeup of Uzbek
politics to build a stronger and more secure power vertical.
He was re-elected in 2007, facing ‘opponents’ who voiced
support for his leadership, despite the fact that hewas term-
limited by the constitution. Political reforms in 2008, while
touted as giving parliament more power, actually strength-
ened the president the right to appoint regional governors
(khokims) as well as the right to disband local assemblies if
they reject his appointments (Borisov, 2008).15 As for polit-
ical parties, the four parties elected to parliament in 2009
have largely similar platforms and are all pro-Karimov.
Changes in the electoral law, similar to those in
Kazakhstan, ostensibly strengthened them by stating that
only partiesdas opposed to citizens’ initiativesdcan nomi-
nate individuals to run for parliament. However, given that
thepresident in effect oversees thework of the parties, this is
hardly a move toward democracy or creating alternative
centers of power. Indeed, the chair of the Uzbek Parliamen-
taryCommitteeonLegislationadmitted that the intent of the
law, as was the case in Kazakhstan, was to prevent ‘trouble-
makers’ from getting into parliament and eliminating the
possibility of parliament to ‘pursue clannishness and
promote parochial interests’ (Ismoliov & Sardov, 2010, 66).
The more important lesson, perhaps, that emerges from
the Kyrgyzstan case is management of patronage politics,
something that Karimov has managed to do for the past
twenty years. Indeed, despite his past assertion that clans
are a threat to the country’s security, one can argue that
Karimov, considered at times the head of the ‘Samarkand
clan’, has played the game of patronage politics very well,
as he ‘streamlined the neo-patrimonial hierarchy and
played off factions against each other as the cornerstone of
his personal regime of power’ (Ilkhamov, 2010, 206–207).
For example, in late 2005, in the wake of events in Bishkek
and Andijan, he dismissed the Defense Minister and engi-
neered the ‘retirement’ of Zakir Almatov, the Interior
Minister and member of the Samarkand clan, who some
observers thought had grown increasingly powerful. This
move bolstered the position of Rustam Inoyatov, head of
the National Security Service and from the ‘Tashkent clan’,
who had served in that post since 1995, was involved in the
massacre in Andijan, and is seen as a Karimov loyalist.
Inoyatov has clearly emerged as a powerful ﬁgure on the
security front and both the Interior Ministry and National
Security Service answer directly to Karimov. Those who fall
out of favordin contrast to what occurred in Kyrgyzstan
but similar towhat one has seen in Kazakhstandare unable
to stage political comebacks, in large part because they lack
any grassroots support or the economic wherewithal to
create rival patronage networks.16 Instead, Karimov hasSamarkand clan and one who helped bring Karimov to power. He was
forced into retirement in 1998, but came back a year later, only to be
dismissed from his government post and charged with corruption in
2004. He ﬂed the country in 2005.
17 Craig Murray, former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan, quoted in RFE/RL
Daily Report, August 31, 2006.
18 Both Hale, 2006, and McGlinchey, 2011, argue that leadership change
in Uzbekistan is likely to be far bloodier and destabilizing than what
occurred in Kyrgyzstan.
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patronage pyramid, constructing a ‘mega-clan’ that is
centered on the presidential family, especially his daughter
Gulnora, who oversees much of the economic life of the
country (Ilkhamov, 2010, 207). The overall effect over time,
however, has not been inclusive but exclusionary and
extractivedconstantly dismissing ofﬁcials in an effort to
play groups off each other, conﬁscating relatively scarce
resources to line his own coffers, and eventually limiting
the number of trusted ofﬁcials has alienated both ordinary
Uzbeks as well as local leaders who are not allowed to reap
the beneﬁts of any largess generated by cotton or mineral
exports that are controlled by the central government and
Karimov personally (McGlinchey, 2011).
Do these moves demonstrate ‘learning’? Are they
inspired by what happened in Kyrgyzstan? This is hard to
say. Karimov, like Nazarbaev, has not been constantly
invoking the Tulip Revolution to justify his policies,
although the crackdowns in 2005 were clearly inspired by
that fears of a similar event occurring in Uzbekistan. Hemay
also be responding to particular domestic circumstances. It
is safe to say, however, that developments since 2005 have
built upon a patterndestablished since the early 1990sdof
repression and centralization, and that Karimov has no
intention of making himself a ‘lame duck’. Lacking the
economic largesse of Kazakhstan, his rulemust rest onmore
repression than co-optation, and one can speculate that he
has created enough enemies that his hold on power is more
tenuous than it seems. However, if and when the revolt
against Karimov comes, there is little evidence to suggest
that it will follow the script of the Tulip Revolution in that
former political insiders that were allowed to gravitate into
the opposition will establish their own rival networks and
bases of support and then seize the initiative to oust him.
4. A look ahead
The overthrow of the Kyrgyz government in 2010, like
the Tulip Revolution, had reverberations across the region.
Reactions followed a similar script. Nazarbaev condemned
the events as ‘complete banditry’ (Najibullah, 2010) and
vowed that he would be the guarantor of stability in his
country. Karimov added that the events were ‘in no one’s
interest’ (Osipovich, 2010), and Uzbekistan closed its
border with Kyrgyzstan. Uzbek security forces have also
stepped up efforts to preempt possible protests by making
suspect individuals sign loyalty letters to the state. If past
practice holds, both leaders will also ensure that very little,
if any, political space will be given to political rivals and
formal and informal power will remain in their hands.
Are these leaders ‘learning’ from political upheavals in
Kyrgyzstan? If so, are they learning the ‘right’ lessons? Both
questions remain hard to answer. Clearly, both the Kazakh
and Uzbek leadership have been troubled by events in
Kyrgyzstan and have taken steps to prevent similar events
from happening in their countries. Much of their focus has
beenon suppressing the opposition,which is something that
had been occurring prior to the Tulip Revolution. As for
lessons related to patronage politics, it is harder to tell if they
havebeenabsorbed, inpartbecauseascertaining themotives
of Nazarbaev and Karimov, beyond a simple desire to stay inpower, is more difﬁcult to uncover. Clearly, both have
concerns about some sort of palace coup andhave dismissed
ofﬁcials they thought might threaten them. Each tries in
various ways to balance clan and institutional factions off
against each other. Each has made moves to centralize and
personalize power. Each retains ﬁrm control of the security
apparatus. Neither has allowed those that fell out of favor to
organize an opposition. Whereas both countries have seen
limited protests, none have been seized upon by political
elites to challenge the incumbent president.
From this perspective, then, the two leaders look secure
and one might argue they have in fact learned many of the
right lessons. However, whether they can continue to play
the game of patronage politics is another question. Both
men will not rule forever, and Kazakhs and Uzbeks are
talking about how leadership succession will proceed.
Whereas both Nazarbaev and Karimov have worked to
ensure they are not lame ducks, there is jockeying for
power as elites try to position themselves for the inevitable.
Nazarbaev, thanks to his cultivation of cross-clan alliances,
the resources at his disposal and the country’s relatively
strong economic condition, does not need to be as heavy-
handed as Karimov and seems more secure politically.
Karimov’s circle of support, meanwhile, may be getting
smaller and smaller, constrained in part by the resources at
his disposal as well as how his policies have created ‘new
losers’ who would be happy to see him go.17 Of course,
predictions of Karimov’s demise have been made before,
and he has shown a willingness to do whatever necessary
to preserve his rule, including turning toward Russia in the
wake of 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan (Osipovich, 2010).
Constant repression of real and would-be opponents,
however, carries risks, and balancing the demands of
various factions or clans in an authoritarian system is
difﬁcult. Karimov’s inability or unwillingness to solve
festering economic and social problems, coupled with
policies that increasingly are designed to serve narrow and
personal interests and alienate important constituencies,
indicate that he may not have learned all the ‘lessons’ of
Kyrgyzstan, making Uzbekistan increasingly volatile and at
risk for a violent change in leadership.18
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